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Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Has the Legislative Response to Diane
Whipple's Death Rendered the Hard-Line
Stance of Elden and Thing Obsolete?
by
MICHAEL JAY GORBACK*
Introduction
The California Supreme Court has often been credited with
leading the nation in creating new and progressive avenues of tort
recovery. In 1968, the court created one such avenue of recovery
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2003; B.A.,
University of California, Santa Barbara, 2000.
1. See Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1247,
1247 (1995). Ms. Sandor and Professor Berry further explain that California is "widely
known for shaping the contours of tort law; it is certainly in the vanguard with respect to
compensation for emotional injury." Id. at n.2. Additionally, Sandor and Berry observe
that California's "liberal tendencies rigorously test the received wisdom behind doctrinal
restrictions on recovery." Id. (citing Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently
Inflicted Economic Loss, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1515 n.7 (1985)) (internal quotations
omitted).
Interestingly, California's "liberal tendencies" with respect to providing progressive forms
of recovery appear to extend far beyond traditional notions of tort law. For example,
California has become one of the first few states to recognize a "moral rights" theory for
the protection of fine art in intellectual property law. Section 987 of the Civil Code now
provides that the "physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of
the artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation," and that there is "a public
interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations." CAL. CiV. CODE §
987(a) (Deering 2001). California's attempts to stay at the forefront of recovery, however,
may at some times be too progressive; as the Visual Artists Rights Act adopted by
Congress in 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 301(f) (2000), has not embraced the same widespread theory
of protection that California has, there may be serious questions as to whether California's
fine art protection statute is preempted by its federal counterpart. See MARGRETH
BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 576 (2d ed. 2001).
[2731
when it decided Dillon v. Legg.2 In Dillon, the court held for the first
time that a bystander who witnessed the negligently caused injury of
another need not be in the "zone of danger" in order to recover for
her resulting emotional distress.' The court explained that the
primary consideration concerning the availability of bystander
recovery was the forseeability that a particular plaintiff would suffer
emotional distress upon witnessing the negligently caused injury to a
third person,4 and delineated three guidelines to assist courts in
determining forseeability on a case-by-case basis.' Those guiding
factors were: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of
the accident, (2) whether the emotional shock resulted from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and (3)
whether the plaintiff and the victim shared a close relationship, as
opposed to only a distant relationship or no relationship at all.6
In the years following Dillon, confusion reigned as to who,
exactly, could qualify as a "closely related" bystander for purposes of
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress. In 1988,
however, in what one commentator has dubbed the "beginning of the
end of the Dillon era,"8 the supreme court held, in Elden v. Sheldon,
that a plaintiff who witnesses the negligent injury of a person with
whom he or she shares a cohabitant relationship akin to marriage
may not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress because
such a plaintiff does not satisfy the third Dillon guideline-i.e., the
guideline suggesting that recovery be limited to plaintiffs that are
closely related to negligence victims.9 The following year, the court
followed up its decision in Elden by holding in Thing v. La Chusa that
in the absence of physical injury or impact to a bystander, that
bystander should only be permitted to recover damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress if he is "closely related to the injury
victim,"'" and went on to conclude that "[a]bsent exceptional
2. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
3. Id. at 920.
4. Id.; see also John L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory
of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477,
482 (1984) ("The Dillon court thus established forseeability as the chief element limiting
the defendant's duty and, therefore, liability.").
5. 441 P.2d at 920.
6. Id.
7. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 821 (Cal. 1989); Moon v. Guardian Postacute
Serv., Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218,221 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
8. Timothy M. Cavanaugh, A New Tort in California: Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress (For Married Couples Only), 41 HASTINGS L.J. 447, 448 (1990).
9. 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1988).
10. 771 P.2d at 815.
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circumstances, recovery should be limited to relatives residing in the
same household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of
the victim."'" Viewed together, therefore, Elden and Thing represent
a decidedly hard-line approach to bystander recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, at least with respect to the "closely
related" element suggested in Dillon and mandated in Thing.2
Recent actions by the California legislature, however, appear to
have undercut several of the policy concerns on which the supreme
court has predicated its strict approach to negligent infliction of
emotional distress over the last fourteen years. Those actions,
culminating in the enactment of section 1714.01 of the Civil Code, 3
found their origin in the bitter aftermath of the brutal dog-mauling
death of Diane Whipple." On January 26, 2001, Diane Alexis
Whipple, a thirty-three year old college lacrosse coach who stood just
over five feet tall and weighed only 110 pounds, was unlocking the
door of her sixth-floor apartment in San Francisco, when two Presa
Canario dogs savagely attacked her.'5 One of the dogs, 123-pound
Bane, latched on to Whipple's neck and dragged the screaming
woman twenty feet down the hallway, while 112-pound Hera
continuously tore at Whipple's clothing. 6 Whipple was pronounced
dead at San Francisco General Hospital only hours later.17 Police
officers attending the scene of the mauling were so horrified by the
11. Id. at 829 n.10. The court also decreed that recovery should be permitted only
when the closely related plaintiff is "present at the scene of the injury producing event at
the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim," and when the
plaintiff "suffers serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond that which would be
anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the
circumstances." Id. at 829-30. As will be explained later in this Note, the court premised
these requirements on a host of policy concerns, such as the potential for "unlimited
liability for emotional distress on a defendant whose conduct is simply negligent." ld.
12. Indeed, at least one court has seriously questioned the California Supreme Court's
position that recovery for emotional distress should be limited to persons closely related
by blood or marriage because those are the only persons most likely to suffer serious
emotional distress upon witnessing injury to a loved one. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d
372,375 (N.J. 1994).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (Deering Supp. 2002).
14. See Lance Williams, Dog Owners Belong in Jail, Roommate Says; Mauling Victim's
Partner Hires Attorney to Monitor Probe, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 7, 2001, at Al.
15. Presa Canarios are actually a mixed breed that is part English mastiff, and part
Canary Island cattle dog. See Maria L. LaGanga & John M. Glionna, San Franciscans
Outraged as They Mourn Dog Attack Victim; Tragedy: Many Demand Prosecution for
Owners of Animal that Mauled Woman. Others Fear New Rules on Pets, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2001, at Al. The breed is so large that neighbors referred to Bane, who was
euthanized following the attack, as the Beast, Killer Dog, and Dog of Death. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
presence of "blood and human hair all over the place" that several
needed psychological counseling. 8
Following Whipple's bloody death, her partner, Sharon Smith, a
vice president at Charles Schwab, was "overcome with shock [and]
numbed by grief."'9 On March 12, 2001, Smith filed a wrongful death
lawsuit against Marjorie Knoller and Robert Noel, the owners of the
two dogs that attacked and killed Whipple.20 In apparent recognition
of the reality that Smith's lawsuit would probably not survive a
motion to dismiss, because "[c]urrent law makes [her] relationship
invisible [for purposes of wrongful death actions], 2' Assemblywoman
Carole Migden, D-San Francisco, introduced Assembly Bill 25.22
While the bill was not introduced in order to quietly sanction gay
marriages, and would arguably only modestly broaden the rights of
domestic partners who register with the state,23 the bill would give
domestic partners the right to bring actions for the wrongful death of
24their partners. Of more significance for purposes of this Note,
however, the bill would also amend the California Civil Code to
provide domestic partners with the right to recover damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.2' After considerable debate,
the California legislature substantially adopted Assemblywoman
18. Id.
19. Williams, supra note 14, at Al.
20. Greg Lucas, Domestic Partners Bill OKd by Panel; Mauled Woman's Companion
Speaks up for Rights Legislation, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 2001, at A3.
21. Id. ("As a partner, Smith has no standing under California law to file a wrongful
death suit-only surviving spouses, children or parents do."). Ironically, Superior Court
Judge A. James Robertson II, who is currently presiding over Smith's wrongful death
action, actually denied Noel's and Knoller's motions to dismiss, finding that Smith had the
right to bring the action pursuant to the California Constitution. See Peter Hartlaub,
Same-sex Partner Can Sue for Damages; Wrongful-Death Claim in Dog-Mauling Case, S.F.
CHRON., July 28, 2001, at Al. Even Smith's attorneys recognize, however, that Judge
Robertson's ruling is unlikely to be the final word in the matter. Id.
22. 2001-02 Reg. Sess. A.B. 25 (Cal. 2002).
23. See Lucas, supra note 20, at A3. It should also be noted that "[d]omestic
partnership is not marriage for same-sex couples. It does not approach the stature of
marriage in terms of the rights and obligations it offers." Kitty Mak, Partners in Law, 24
L.A. LAW. 35 (July/Aug. 2001).
24. See Hartlaub, supra note 21, at Al; see also S. JUD. COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, (Cal.
Jul. 10, 2001) ("Among the rights, privileges, and standing this bill provides domestic
partners consistent with the rights, privileges and standing of spouses ... are: ... [t]he
right to assert a cause of action for wrongful death .... ); S. FLOOR, BILL ANALYSIS (Cal.
Oct. 30, 2001).
25. See S. JUD. COMM., supra note 24 ("Among the rights, privileges, and standing this
bill provides domestic partners consistent with the rights, privileges and standing of
spouses.., are: [t]he right to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional
distress .... ).
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Migden's bill, and enacted, among other things, section 1714.01 of the
Civil Code.26 Section 1714.01 provides, "Domestic partners shall be
entitled to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional
distress to the same extent that spouses are entitled to do so under
California law.
'27
Certainly, the Legislature's approval of Assembly Bill 25 and its
enactment of section 1714.01 appears to be in contravention of the
position taken by the supreme court in Elden and Thing-specifically,
that public policy demands limiting recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress to spouses and blood relatives. This Note, without
directly addressing the merits of the California legislature's extension
of the right to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress to
domestic partners,' will assert that since the legislature has extended
that right to domestic partners, we must seriously question the
continuing validity of the supreme court's hard-line approach to
recovery, as represented by its decisions in Elden and Thing.
Section I of this Note will briefly catalogue the development of
emotional distress law in the United States and, more specifically, in
California. It will first address the traditional reluctance of the courts
in this country to award damages for emotional distress, and will
conclude with a discussion of the California Supreme Court's
groundbreaking decision in Dillon v. Legg. Section II will address the
reaction to Dillon in the California courts, focusing specifically on
judicial treatment of the third Dillon guideline, which suggested that
recovery be limited to those plaintiffs who share a close relationship
with the negligence victim. The section will recount the few decisions
that extended the right to recover to plaintiffs related to negligence
victims by neither blood nor marriage, and will conclude by exploring
the policy justifications underlying the court's decisions in Elden and
Thing. Finally, section III of this Note will assert that in light of the
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (Deering Supp. 2002).
27. Id.
28. Opponents of Assemblywoman Migden's bill and of the enactment of section
1714.01 have forcefully argued that the bill contravenes the will of the majority of
Californians, who overwhelmingly approved Proposition 22, which specifically provided
that only marriages between men and women will be recognized as valid in California. See
Lucas, supra note 20, at A3. According to Randy Thomasson, the executive director of
the Campaign for California Families, Assembly Bill 25 represents "an end run around
voters. It's an end run around marriage. It's unconscionable to give 11 married rights to
people who are not married." Id. Still others have persuasively argued that by "awarding
spousal rights to non-spouses, [Assembly Bill] 25 would reject 61.4 percent of the voters in
the state who want to protect marriage rights between a man and a woman." S. FLOOR,
supra note 24.
California legislature's apparent willingness to accept the proposition
that relationships other than those grounded in blood or marriage,
such as domestic partnerships, may be sufficiently intimate to justify
the extension of the right to recover for negligently inflicted
emotional distress, the court's current hard-line approach, as
represented by its holdings in Elden and Thing, should be discarded.
Specifically, this Note will argue for the adoption of the approach
taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dunphy v. Gregor, in
which the court held that the law "should not ignore the fact of a deep
emotional attachment between.., any two persons who share an
adequately earnest emotional commitment in a relationship that is
functionally equivalent to familial."29 Indeed, this is the only approach
that can be reconciled with the legislature's extension of the right to
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress to domestic
partners.
I. Emotional Distress: An Historical Analysis of Recovery
Today, claims for emotional distress ° damages are literally a
staple of trial practice. 1  "To the plaintiff's attorney, claims for
emotional distress damages are precursors to impassioned closing
arguments for damages well above the claimant's fairly ascertainable
compensatory damages."32  Indeed, the widespread availability of
damages for emotional distress is so pervasive in the realm of tort law
that the ability of parties to avoid potentially costly litigation by
settling out of court often depends on the extent to which the parties
can successfully "assess a claimant's emotional distress damages at
either the outset of a case or during the early stages of discovery."33
The availability of damages for various forms of emotional distress,
however, has not always been a certainty, and was, in fact, completely
foreclosed at common law.
29. 642 A.2d 372, 374 (N.J. 1994) (emphasis added).
30. The term "emotional distress" commonly encompasses a variety of breeds of
mental suffering, including anxiety, worry, fright, grief, nervousness, shock, humiliation,
and indignity. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 816 (Cal. 1989) (citing Deevy v. Tassi,
130 P.2d 389, 396 (Cal. 1942)).
31. See George G. Romain, Distress Signals, 21 L.A. LAW. 32,33 (Feb. 1999).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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A. The Early Days
The opportunity to recover damages for emotional distress was
almost non-existent at common law.34 Despite the commonly
repeated, and almost universally accepted, "fundamental principle of
our judicial system"-that for every wrong there is a remedy35-
common law courts simply refused to recognize emotional injury, as
opposed to physical injury, as legally cognizable.36 Among the several
and varied justifications set forth for denying recovery for emotional
distress were: (1) emotional distress is too remote from a negligent
defendant's actions, and thus fails to satisfy the proximate causation
requirement of recovery;37 (2) mental or emotional harms, unlike
physical injuries, are incapable of quantification, and thus might lead
to the prevalence of falsified or severely exaggerated claims;38 and (3)
suddenly allowing plaintiffs to recover for claims of emotional
distress, when the availability of such a remedy had never before
34. See Sandor & Berry, supra note 1, at 1251; Diamond, supra note 4, at 480 ("Courts
traditionally have been reluctant to allow compensation to anyone for mental distress.");
see also Colleen Wilcox Heidenreich, Comment, Clarifying California's Approach to
Claims of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 277,283 (1995).
35. Sandor & Berry, supra note 1, at 1251 (citing Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins.
Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)).
36. Id. at 1251-52 (citing Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896)).
37. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896); Chittick v.
Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 73 A. 4, 6 (Pa. 1909); Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863
(1861). For an interesting discussion of how "gendered judicial decision-making" factored
into the Lynch decision, see Sandor & Berry, supra note 1, at 1252 n.20.
38. See Lynch, 11 Eng. Rep. at 863 ("[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value,
and does not pretend to redress ... "); Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 355. See also Perry v. Capital
Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 56
N.E. 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 1900); Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 61 A. 1022 (Pa. 1905).
Sandor and Berry postulate that the idea that emotional harm is incapable of
quantification while physical injuries generally are capable of such quantification finds its
origin in a questionable factual premise. Supra note 1, at 1254. They contend that some
physical injuries, such as whiplash and back disorders, are "probably easier to feign than is
severe emotional distress." Id. (citing Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort
Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 352 (1984)). Moreover, according to
Sandor and Berry, emotional injury is often distinguished by definite and recognizable
symptoms that would render "successfully inventing an emotional injury... difficult at
best." Id. Finally, even if serious psychological distress were not so difficult to feign,
Sandor and Berry conclude that the "sophistication of the medical profession can help
courts to ferret out nonmeritorious claims." Id. (citing Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509,
512 (Haw. 1970)). In Rodrigues, the Supreme Court of Hawaii observed, "In judging the
genuineness of a claim of mental distress, courts and juries may look to the quality and
genuineness of proof and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophistication of the
medical profession and the ability of the court and jury to weed out dishonest claims." 472
P.2d at 512 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
existed, would lead to unmanageable civil dockets as plaintiffs rushed
to seek compensation for their injured feelings.39
Of course, denial of recovery for various aspects of emotional
injury did not remain absolute. Increasingly, advances in science and
medicine began to erode the belief that psychic injury could not be
sufficiently quantified to support an award of damages. ° Initially,
emotional distress was recognized as an "aggravation of damages
sought under intentional tort theories."" In Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, the California Supreme Court observed, "As
early as 1896, this court recognized that mental suffering constitutes
an aggravation of damages when it naturally ensues from the act
complained of. '42  In most jurisdictions, however, including
California, causing mental distress did not, in and of itself, create a
right of action.4 '3 To the contrary, emotional distress continued to be
relegated to the position of parasitic damages in intentional tort
actions." As the California Supreme Court observed in Thing,
39. See Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354-55; see also Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 47 N.E.
88, 89 (Mass. 1897); Ward v. W. Jersey & S. Ry. Co., 47 A. 561 (N.J. 1900).
40. See J. Mark Appleberry, Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Focus
on Relationships, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 304-05 (1995).
41. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 816 (Cal. 1989); see also Diamond, supra note 4,
at 480 ("The initial common law rule allowed recovery for mental pain only as parasitic
damages accompanying physical injury."); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 50 (4th ed. 1971).
42. 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980) (citing Sloane v. S. Cal. Ry. Co., 44 P. 320, 322 (Cal.
1896)) (internal quotations omitted).
43. Thing, 771 P.2d at 816; Sloane, 44 P. at 322 (distinguishing nervous shock,
paroxysm, and nervous system disorders on the one hand, from mere psychological harm
on the other, and holding that psychological suffering alone would be insufficient to
support a right of action and an award of damages).
44. Thing, 771 P.2d at 816 (citing 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW, TORTS § 402, at
483 (9th ed. 1988)). It is worth noting that an early exception to the general rule that
emotional distress could only be compensated as a parasitic item of damages, was the
intentional tort of assault. Id. Perhaps the earliest recorded decision granting relief for
the emotional distress caused as a result of an assault is the classic case of I de S et ux. v.
W de S, Y.B.Lib.Ass. folio 99, placitum 60 (Assizes 1348) (in VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET
AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 34 (10th ed.
2000)). Today, assault is commonly accepted as a tort that recognizes an individual's right
to enjoy peace of mind and to live without fear of personal harm. See Id. (citing Lowry v.
Standard Oil Co., 146 P.2d 57, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944)). Despite this common acceptance
of the theory underlying recovery for assault, however, at least one commentator has
stated that allowing recovery for emotional distress in actions based on intentional
conduct was not originally in recognition of a plaintiff's right to mental tranquility, but was
instead to provide an alternate dispute resolution mechanism, which would be preferable
to exacting revenge via self-help. See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for
Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34
U. FLA. L. REV. 477,486 (1982).
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Recognition of emotional distress as a compensable injury when
caused by an intentional tort carried with it a judgment that the
defendant's conduct was sufficiently outrageous or unacceptable
that an award of damages was justified to punish the tortfeasor and
deter such conduct by others."
The court further explained that "[t]his development led in turn
to a focus on the nature of the defendant's conduct, rather than on
identifying a traditional tort to justify recovery for infliction of
emotional distress, and culminated in recognition of the tort now
known as intentional infliction of emotional distress.,
46
One of the first cases to recognize intentional infliction of
emotional distress as a cognizable injury in tort was State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff" In Siliznoff, the California Supreme
Court officially recognized that freedom from emotional distress is,
under certain circumstances, an interest worthy of protection in its
own right, and that "it is possible to quantify and compensate for the
invasion of that interest through an award of monetary damages even
when the severity of the emotional distress is not manifested in
physical symptoms." 8 At the time Siliznoff was handed down,
however, plaintiffs in negligence actions had not yet been permitted
to recover for their emotional distress absent some showing of
accompanying physical injury.49
B. Beyond Siliznoffi From Physical Injury to Dillon
Despite the unwillingness of courts to allow victims of
negligence, as opposed to victims of intentional tortious conduct, to
recover damages for their emotional distress, a less generous line of
cases permitting the recovery of monetary damages for emotional
distress resulting from negligence had begun to develop in American
jurisdictions at the time Siliznoff was decided. This section will
explore the development of that line of decisions, which initially
required a negligence victim to have suffered physical injury either
before or after the onslaught of emotional harm, and which
culminated with the California Supreme Court's decision in Dillon v.
Legg, where the court departed from the majority rule and, for the
first time, allowed a bystander to the negligently caused injury of a
45. 771 P.2d at 816-17.
46. Id. at 817.
47. 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
48. See Thing, 771 P.2d at 817.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 818.
third person to recover for emotional distress, despite suffering no
physical impact, and being located outside the "zone of danger."5
(1) It's a Step: Injury and Impact
In cases involving negligence, rather than intentional torts such
as battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the right to
recover for emotional distress in California, as well as in most
American jurisdictions, was initially limited to "circumstances in
which the victim was himself injured and emotional distress was a
'parasitic' item of damages." 2 Going only a slight step further was
the rule that permitted recovery if the plaintiff had not suffered
physical injury as a direct result of the negligent act, but did suffer
physical injury as a result or by-product of the emotional injury.53 In
what became known simply as the "injury rule," a plaintiff seeking
damages for emotional distress resulting from the defendant's
negligent act was required to "demonstrate some physical illness,
injury or other manifestations of her emotional injury. 54
The most common explanation for requiring at least some
manifestation of physical injury, either as a direct result of the
negligent act or as a result of the emotional distress that resulted from
the negligent act, was that physical injury provided concrete evidence
of the genuineness of the claim.5   Such concrete, ascertainable
evidence would therefore aid the courts in limiting recovery to "truly
deserving individuals."56  Further, requiring the claimed emotional
distress to result in or from physical injury served as a screening
device that would "minimize a presumed risk of feigned injuries and
false claims."57 Several courts, however, began to hold that a plaintiff
51. 441 P.2d at, 920-21; see also Diamond, supra note 4, at 477.
52. Thing, 771 P.2d at 817; see also Diamond, supra note 4, at 480 ("The initial
common law rule allowed recovery for mental pain only as parasitic damages
accompanying physical injury") (citing PROSSER, supra note 41, § 12, at 50); Cavanaugh,
supra note 8, at 451; Appleberry, supra note 40, at 304 ("Traditionally, courts recognized
emotional distress claims only when the psychic harm accompanied a physical injury");
Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 4 P.2d 532, 533 (Cal. 1931); Lindley v. Knowlton, 176
P.2d 440, 441 (Cal. 1918); Ward v. W. Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., 47 A. 561, 561-62 (N.J.
1900); State v. Daniel, 48 S.E. 544, 545 (N.C. 1904); Brooker v. Silverthorne, 99 S.E. 350,
351-52 (S.C. 1919).
53. See, e.g., Thing, 771 P.2d at 817; Webb, 4 P.2d at 533; Lindley, 176 P.2d at 441.
54. See Sandor & Berry, supra note 1, at 1260-61.
55. See Appleberry, supra note 40, at 304; Cavanaugh, supra note 8, at 451.
56. Appleberry, supra note 40, at 304.
57. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 818-19 (Cal. 1980)("Our courts have
instead devised various means of compensating for the infliction of emotional distress,
provided there is some assurance of the validity of the claim. As we have seen, physical
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seeking damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress did not
have to demonstrate any physical injury, as long as the plaintiff had
suffered some physical impact caused by the defendant's negligent
conduct. 8 Under this "impact rule," courts were able to extend
recovery rights to a larger category of plaintiffs, while still
maintaining their conviction that the emotional distress was nothing
more than "parasitic damages. '"" Under the impact doctrine,
however, the physical impact, even if it did not result in physical
injury, nevertheless was treated as a "surrogate" for personal injury,
and could therefore support a finding of parasitic emotional distress
damages.6"
(2) The "Zone of Danger" and Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.
Once courts began to allow mere impact to take the place of
genuine physical injury in cases involving claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the degree or severity of impact
required to support an award of damages grew increasingly trivial."61
Indeed, Professors Sandor and Berry have observed that as a result of
the general trend among American courts to interpret the "impact"
requirement quite liberally, "the most trifling impact" began to
injury, whether it occurs contemporaneously with or is a consequence of emotional
distress, provides one such guarantee."); see also Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 500
P.2d 880, 882-83 (Cal. 1972).
It should be noted that two early exceptions to the rule that allowed recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress only upon some physical manifestation, were the
cases allowing recovery for emotional injury resulting from the negligent mishandling of a
corpse, and that resulting from the negligent transmission of a message concerning the
health of a family member. See Heidenreich, supra note 34, at 284. Indeed, in Chelini v.
Nieri, 196 P.2d 915, 919 (Cal. 1948), the court approved a judgment in favor of a plaintiff
whose mother the defendant mortuary had negligently sealed in a casket. Similarly, in
Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (N.C. 1949), the court upheld recovery for
emotional distress where the defendant had negligently permitted mud and water to
penetrate the vault of the plaintiff's deceased husband. Finally, in two cases involving an
early telecommunications giant, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Redding, 129 So. 743,
747 (Fla. 1930), and Russ v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 23 S.E.2d 681, 683 (N.C. 1943),
the courts upheld findings of liability for emotional distress where the defendant telegraph
company misinterpreted a telegraphic message concerning the plaintiff's daughter's
medical test results on one hand, and failed to deliver a message concerning the death of
the plaintiff's brother on the other hand.
58. See Diamond, supra note 4, at 480; Sandor & Berry, supra note 1, at 1260; see also
PROSSER, supra note 41, § 54, at 331; Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 62 N.E. 737,
737 (Mass. 1902); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351,354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961).
59. Sandor & Berry, supra note 1, at 1260.
60. Id.
61. Id. (observing that "courts have found impact in [cases involving only] minor
contacts with the person which play no part in causing the real harm, and in themselves,
can have no importance").
suffice in an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
62
One case around the turn of the twentieth century even held that
some tiny dust particles' invasion of the plaintiff's eye, as an indirect
result of the defendant's negligence, was sufficient to support an
award of damages for emotional distress.63
The willingness of courts around the country to entertain actions
for emotional distress damages upon only slight and trivial impact,
and the occurrence of several cases involving "near misses," led the
courts of most jurisdictions, including California, to adopt the "zone
of danger" rule.6 Under this theory of recovery, a plaintiff would be
entitled to damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress if she
could demonstrate that she was proximately located so close to the
defendant's negligent conduct that a physical injury, or at least a
physical impact, could have occurred. 5 Physical impact was not
considered a prerequisite to recovery under the zone of danger
analysis.66 The "zone of danger" theory of liability was quickly
adopted by a majority of American jurisdictions. 6  After 1950, the
number of courts that had adopted the "zone of danger" theory of
62. Id. at 1261. See also Homans, 62 N.E. at 737, in which the "impact" that justified
an award of damages for emotional distress was only a slight blow to the person, which
resulted in no physical injury; Zelinsky, 175 A.2d at 354, where the court specifically
conceded that "any degree of physical impact, however slight" will support an award of
damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress.
63. See Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 63 A. 860, 860 (N.J. 1906). See also
Heidenreich, supra note 34, at 285 ("The 'impact' could be met by relatively traditional
incidences of impact, such as a vehicle colliding with the plaintiff, as well as seemingly
minor incidences, such as inhalation of smoke, dust in the eye, a minor burn, electric
shock, or even a slight jar or jolt.") (emphasis added) (citing Porter, 63 A. at 863; Howard
v. Bloodworth, 224 S.E.2d 122, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Sam Finley Inc., v. Russell, 42
S.E.2d 452, 456 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947)).
64. Diamond, supra note 4, at 480; see also Heindenreich, supra note 34. Heidenreich
places the origin of the "zone of danger" rule in the "deterioration of the impact rule by
way of minor incidences ..... Id.
65. Id.
66. Diamond, supra note 4, at 480 (citing Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390 (Mich.
1970); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961); Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84
(Pa. 1970); 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 148-49 (1959)).
67. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 518 (Cal. 1963). The
court in Amaya observed, "In every jurisdiction that has ruled on this precise question-
some 18 in addition to California-the decisions appear to be uniform in upholding the
rule of nonliability [if the plaintiff was located outside the zone of danger]." Id. See also
Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935), in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court unanimously held that a negligent defendant is not liable for any "physical injuries
sustained by one out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of
witnessing another's danger." (emphasis added).
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liability drastically increased. 68  Even the Supreme Court of the
United States affixed its seal of approval to the zone of danger theory
of liability in the context of the Federal Employer's Liability Act.69
In 1963, the California Supreme Court got its opportunity to end
the rampant speculation as to whether the "zone of danger" rule had
permanently replaced any requirement of physical injury or impact in
California negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.7" That
opportunity came in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.7 The
facts of Amaya were relatively straightforward, and therefore
appeared to provide the court with an excellent opportunity to clarify
the law regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress in
California. In Amaya, the plaintiff was watching over her 17 month-
old son, James, as he played near the street.72 At one point, the
plaintiff became aware that the defendants' negligently driven truck
was bearing down on her son.73 She shouted a warning to the
defendants as they approached James, but the warnings came too late
and the plaintiff was "compelled to stand helpless and watch her
infant son be struck and run over by the defendants' truck.,
74
In Amaya, the plaintiff alleged that,
as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' negligent
operation of their truck, she suffered an emotional shock and great
68. Amaya, 379 P.2d at 518 (citing Strazza v. McKittrick, 156 A.2d 149, 152 (Conn.
1959); ); Preece v. Baur, 143 F. Supp. 804, 806 (D. Idaho 1956); Angst v. Great N. Ry. Co.,
131 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D. Minn. 1955); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952);
Williamson v. Bennett, 112 S.E.2d 48, 55 (N.C. 1960); Van Hoy v. Okla. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 235 P.2d 948, 949 (Okla. 1951); Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 77
N.W.2d 397,403-04 (Wis. 1956); King v. Phillips, 1 Q.B. 429 (1953).
69. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 554-55 (1994). One
commentator has suggested that the Court's adoption of the zone of danger analysis in the
context of Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) was premised on the Court's belief
that a "more relaxed test for [negligent infliction of emotional distress] claims would not
be faithful to legislative intent when enacting FELA." Appleberry, supra note 40, at 306.
For a brief yet insightful discussion of the merits of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gotshall, see generally, William T. Krizner, Is There a Better Standard than the Zone of
Danger Test for Negligent Emotional Distress Claims under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act?, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 907 (1999).
70. Prior to 1963, the question of whether a plaintiff was required to plead and prove
some sort of physical injury or physical impact had come before the California Supreme
Court on several occasions. In each of those cases, however, the court avoided resolving
the issue. See Amaya, 379 P.2d at 514-15 (citing Easton v. United Trade School
Contracting Co., 159 P.2d 597, 599 (Cal. 1916); Lindley v. Knowlton, 176 P. 440, 441 (Cal.
1918); Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 4 P.2d 532, 533 (Cal. 1931)).
71. 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963).
72. Id. at 514.
73. Id.
74. Id.
mental disturbance.., and became violently ill and nauseous [sic]
and was hurt and injured in her health, strength and activity,
sustaining injury to her body and shock and injury to her nervous
system and person."
Significantly, however, the plaintiff did not allege that she
suffered these injuries as a result of fear for her own safety.76 Indeed,
the trial court had even offered plaintiff the opportunity to amend her
complaint to specifically allege that the emotional distress complained
of was a result of the plaintiff's fear for her own well-being." The
plaintiff declined the offer, however, and reiterated that the
psychological injuries she suffered, as well as the physical symptoms
resulting from those injuries, were the "result of being compelled to
watch her infant child crushed beneath the wheels of an ice truck, and
that all the fright and shock she suffered was as a result of her fear for
the safety of her child, and not out of fear for her own safety."7 The
California Supreme Court therefore accepted the defendants'
position that plaintiff Amaya had stipulated to the issue as being,
whether liability "may be predicated on fright or nervous shock (with
consequent bodily illness) induced solely by the plaintiff's
apprehension of negligently caused danger or injury to a third
person."7 9
Before determining whether the court of appeal had correctly
rejected Amaya's claim for damages, the supreme court explained
that "[a]t the outset it is necessary to determine whether or not the
'impact rule' is in force in California: i.e., in an action for personal
injuries resulting from the internal operation of negligently induced
fright or shock, need the plaintiff show that there was some
contemporaneous physical impact upon her person?"8  The court
observed that if the "impact rule" was the law of the state, then it
would be patently obvious that plaintiff Amaya could not recover,
because at no point did she experience any impact with the
defendants' ice truck. The court concluded that no California court
75. Id. (citing plaintiff Amaya's complaint for damages, in which she requested relief
in the amount of $50,000, in addition to medical expenses related to what she claimed was
a permanent disability) (internal quotations omitted).
76 Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 514.
80. Id. at 514-15 (citing 64 A.L.R.2d 100 etseq.).
81. Id. One might wonder, however, in light of a long line of American cases that had
allowed recovery upon a showing of some de minimis impact, such as Porter v. Delaware,
L. & W.R. Co., 63 A. 860, 860 (N.J. 1906), in which the court affirmed an award of
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had expressly declared that the "impact rule" governed emotional
distress claims in the state, and that the court was "not disposed to
introduce [the impact rule] into our law now."82 Accordingly, the
court held that plaintiff Amaya's failure to allege a
"contemporaneous physical impact upon her person" did not, by
itself, render the complaint defective.83
After holding that the "impact rule" was not controlling in
California, however, the Amaya court approvingly cited several
earlier cases that, without using the phrase, "zone of danger," had
nevertheless held that a plaintiff may only recover for emotional
distress if she was sufficiently close to the defendant's negligent
conduct to fear for her own safety. ' Perhaps even more persuasive in
the eyes of the court, however, was the most recently completed draft
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which expressly adopted the
"zone of danger" theory of liability.85  The Amaya court therefore
concluded that while a plaintiff seeking damages for negligently
inflicted emotional distress need not suffer a physical injury or
impact, the plaintiff must have at least been in the zone of danger
created by the defendants' allegedly negligent conduct.86
damages when the only 'impact' had resulted from some dust invading the plaintiff's eyes,
whether Amaya might have been entitled to damages had she perhaps alleged that some
snow or dirt from the street sprayed at her when the truck veered towards the curb and
struck her son.
82. 379 P.2d at 515.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 515-17. The court placed its greatest reliance on Reed v. Moore, 319 P.2d
80, 81-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), in which the court of appeal rejected the plaintiff's claim
for emotional distress damages, where the plaintiff had suffered mental shock and a
miscarriage as a result of being in fear of her husband's safety, but not her own. In Reed,
the court held, "[t]he case, therefore, is authority to sustain the rule that physical injury
due to fright or shock as a result of fear for one's own safety is compensable. It is not,
however, authority to sustain an action for damages produced by an apprehended danger
or peril to a third person." Id. at 81. (emphasis added).
85. Amaya, 379 P.2d at 518 ("The modern unanimity of view upon the issue now
before us is reflected in the evolution of the relevant section of the Restatement of
Torts."). The court further observed that one of the comments to a newly drafted section
of the Restatement invoked an example that was directly analogous to the facts in Amaya.
Indeed, comment d to subsection (2) provided: "Thus, where the actor negligently runs
down and kills a child in the street, and its mother, in the immediate vicinity, witnesses the
event and suffers severe emotional distress, resulting in a heart attack or other bodily
harm to her, she cannot recover for such bodily harm unless she was herself in the path of
the vehicle, or was in some other manner threatened with bodily harm, otherwise than
through the emotional distress at the peril to her child." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 313(2) cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1960).
86. 379 P.2d at 514 (concluding that "the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action and that the judgment [granting the defendants' demurrer]
should therefore by affirmed.").
Among the policy justifications invoked by the court in support
of its holding were various "administrative and socioeconomic
factors., 87 On the administrative side, the court expressed its concern
with what it considered the inherently complex and difficult task of
proving and quantifying emotional injury.88 With regard to the
"socioeconomic and moral factors," the court pointed to the
inevitable effects on the insurance industry that would result from
"the far-reaching extension of liability that would follow from judicial
abrogation of the [zone of danger] rule."89 Amaya's legacy, however,
proved to be short-lived.9°
(3) Forseeability and the Dillon era
The physical injury and impact doctrines, as well as the "zone of
danger" analysis adopted by the Amaya court, were premised on the
notion that recovery for emotional distress should be limited to
"direct" victims of a negligent defendant's actions, or those victims to
whom the defendant owed a direct duty.9 1 Over time, however,
increasing numbers of "bystander" victims, or those that had not been
physically impacted or within the zone of danger, contended that they
should be entitled to recover for the emotional distress caused by
witnessing negligently caused injury to another.92 Only five years
after the California Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Amaya, a grieving mother named Margery Dillon appeared before
87. Id. at 522-25. ("Justice... exists only when it can be effectively administered.").
88. Id. at 522-24. The court recognized that in recent years, it had "become almost
trite for legal writers to deprecate such reasoning," id. at 522, and conceded that in State
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952), even the California
Supreme Court had rejected the argument that quantifying emotional injury is too difficult
to justify awarding compensatory damages. Id. The court, however, distinguished cases
such as Siliznoff, where the defendant's actions were intentional, from cases involving
mere negligence: "To begin with the problem of proof, it is to be observed that in
Siliznoff we were dealing with the intentional infliction of fright; we reasoned that [t]he
jury is ordinarily in a better position, however, to determine whether outrageous conduct
results in mental distress than whether that distress in turn results in physical injury. From
their own experience jurors are aware of the extent and character of the disagreeable
emotions that may result from the defendant's conduct, but a difficult medical question is
presented when it must be determined if emotional distress resulted in physical injury."
Id. at 522-23 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). The court concluded that in
cases involving negligently, as opposed to intentionally, inflicted emotional distress, that
"difficult medical question" cannot be avoided. Id. at 523.
89. Id. at 525. See also Cavanaugh, supra note 8, at 452.
90. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 819 (Cal. 1989).
91. See Appleberry, supra note 40, at 309.
92. See id.
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the high court and urged it to discard Amaya's adherence to the
"zone of danger" rule.
In Dillon v. Legg, two persons witnessed the defendant
negligently drive his automobile into a child named Erin Lee Dillon,
as she lawfully crossed the street in front of her house.93 One of the
witnesses was the child's mother, and the other was her sister.94
Plaintiff Margery Dillon filed a complaint that stated three separate
causes of action. The first claim was for the wrongful death of her
daughter, and alleged that the defendant's negligent operation of his
car caused it to "collide with the deceased Erin Lee Dillon resulting
in injuries to decedent which proximately resulted in her death." 95
The second cause of action alleged that Margery Dillon had been "in
close proximity to the.., collision and personally witnessed said
collision," and that "because of the negligence of defendants...
plaintiff.., sustained great emotional disturbance and shock and
injury to her nervous system," which shock had caused her severe
physical and mental pain and suffering. 9 Finally, the complaint's
third cause of action substantially repeated the allegations of the
second cause of action, but with respect to Cheryl Dillon, the
decedent's sister, rather than Margery.97
After filing his answer, the defendant moved for judgment on the
pleadings as to the latter two causes of action.9 In support of his
motion, the defendant relied primarily on the California Supreme
court's holding in Amaya, asserting, "No cause of action is stated in
that allegation that plaintiff sustained emotional distress, fright or
shock induced by apprehension of negligently caused danger or injury
or the witnessing of negligently caused injury to a third person. ' 99
The defendant further contended that "[e]ven where a child, sister or
spouse is the object of the plaintiff's apprehension, no cause of action
is stated unless the complaint alleges that the plaintiff suffered
emotional distress, fright or shock as a result of fear for his own
safety."" The superior court granted the defendant's motion as to
the mother's claim, but denied defendant's motion as to the sister's
93. 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing P1's Compl. at 3) (internal quotations omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 914-15.
99. Id. (citing Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513,515 (Cal. 1963)).
100. Id. at 915 (citing Reed v. Moore, 319 P.2d 80, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)) (emphasis in
original).
claim."'1 Then, in response to defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the sister's claim of negligently inflicted emotional
distress, the superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 2
According to the supreme court, "[t]he trial court apparently
sustained the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the second
cause as to the mother because she was not within the zone of danger
and denied that motion as to the third cause involving Cheryl because
of the possibility that she was within such zone of danger or feared for
her own safety."'0 3  The supreme court accordingly characterized
Dillon as a "case that dramatically illustrates the difference in result
flowing from the alleged requirement that a plaintiff cannot recover
for emotional trauma in witnessing the death of a child or sister unless
she also feared for her own safety because she was actually within the
zone of physical impact."' 4
The Dillon court faced a factual scenario that acutely illustrated
the possibility of a surprisingly arbitrary result under the "zone of
danger" analysis it adopted in Amaya: that a difference of only a few
feet could effectively determine which of several similarly situated
plaintiffs could recover for emotional distress caused by an act of
negligence.' The court, itself, exclaimed, "[t]he case thus illustrates
the fallacy of the rule that would deny recovery in the one situation
and grant it in the other."'" Therefore, the court laid the "zone of
danger" theory of liability to rest, observing that the facts of Dillon
served to expose the "hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger
rule."' 7
In place of the "zone of danger" rule that had prevailed under
Amaya, the California Supreme Court in Dillon interposed a duty
analysis, which mandated that "[i]n the absence of 'overriding policy
considerations... forseeability of risk is of... primary importance in
establishing the element of duty.""" In establishing forseeability as
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Cavanaugh, supra note 8, at 452. See also Diamond, supra note 4, at 482 ("The
plaintiffs, a mother and daughter, both witnessed another daughter being hit and killed,
but only the surviving daughter was arguably in the zone of physical danger.")
106. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 919 (citing Grafton v. Mollica, 42 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
Additionally, the court found persuasive the reasoning of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 344 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928), in which Chief Judge Cardozo eloquently opined, "The
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed ......
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the "chief element limiting the defendant's duty and, therefore [his]
liability," the Dillon court rejected the policy arguments that the
same court had heavily relied upon only five years earlier when it
decided Amaya.1°  For example, the majority flatly rejected the
defendant's contention that extending recovery rights to plaintiffs
outside the zone of danger would result in a flood of fraudulent
claims of emotional distress." The court reasoned that while it was
true that liability for any negligent act might extend infinitely if mere
foreseeability were the only guiding factor, negligent defendants
would not be unfairly subjected to liability because "the law of torts
holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to
defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable.""'
In setting forth foreseeability, and thus, the defendant's duty, as
the primary focal point in determining whether a plaintiff might
recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress, the Dillon court
observed that because a negligent actor's duty is "inherently
intertwined with foreseeability," a defendant's duty "must necessarily
be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis."". Commenting that
no "immutable rule" can be used to pre-formulate every negligent
defendant's duty in every conceivable circumstance, the court
delineated a set of "guidelines" which it hoped would aid lower courts
in determining duty and liability on a case-by-case basis.' The three
factors set forth by the court were: (1) whether the plaintiff was
located near the scene of the accident, as opposed to far away from it;
(2) whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon
the plaintiff from the "sensory and contemporaneous observance" of
the negligent act; and (3) whether the plaintiff and victim were
"closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or
the presence of only a distant relationship.""4 Although the Dillon
court anticipated that future courts would be able to mechanically
apply its guidelines in determining liability for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, California courts struggled with the factors and
often reached inconsistent results."5
109. Diamond, supra note 4, at 482.
110. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 917-19.
111. Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 920.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Cavanaugh, supra note 8, at 453.
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II. The Aftermath of Dillon: Who is "Closely Related"?
Professor John Diamond has commented that "[tlhe Dillon
criterion that requires a close relationship between the victim and the
bystander plaintiff is clearly relevant to a foreseeability analysis."...6
He explains that it is "relatively unlikely that a bystander will suffer
profound mental distress upon learning of a stranger's tragedy."".7
However, neither Professor Diamond, nor the Dillon majority itself,
apparently credited the possibility that the court's failure to define
"closely related" might wreak havoc on the lower courts. Moreover,
both Diamond and the court failed to recognize that if the courts
were to ever apply a strict "blood or marriage" definition to "closely
related," then a significant class of deserving and foreseeable
plaintiffs-the class existing between the two extremes of blood and
marriage relations on one hand, and mere strangers on the other
hand-would be effectively foreclosed from recovering for
negligently inflicted emotional distress."" More specifically, those
plaintiffs that could allege and demonstrate relationships
"functionally equivalent" to intimate familial relationships would be
denied recovery."'
A. Confusion in the Lower Courts
When the California Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Dillon, delineating its three guidelines in the process, the court
expected that the lower courts would, on a case-by-case basis, utilize
those guidelines to determine the extent of negligent defendants'
liability.20 The court hoped that over time, the lower courts and the
courts of appeal would "mark out the areas of liability, excluding the
116. Diamond, supra note 4, at 488.
117. Id. Indeed, Professor Diamond posits that if this "close relationship" prong were
the only aspect of the Dillon guidelines used to limit a defendant's liability, "it could
hardly be called arbitrary or inconsistent with foreseeability concepts .... " ld at 488-89.
He then goes on to state that it was the other two prongs of the Dillon guidelines that
wrought havoc on the courts in the years following Dillon. Id. at 489.
118. Another commentator has observed, "A bystander's mental distress is directly
correlative to the strength of the [emotional] bond between that bystander and the victim.
Therefore, recovery should logically be based on exactly that, the strength of the bond."
Sheila A. Hallahan, The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Declines to Expand the
Scope of the 'Immediate Family' Requirement for Bystander Recovery under the Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress Doctrine, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 439, 445 (1993).
119. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 373 (N.J. 1994). Such a result would violate the
intuitive maxim that the ability to recover should be based on the strength of the bond
between the plaintiff and the negligence victim. See Hallahan, supra note 118, at 445.
120. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 921.
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remote and unexpected.' 121 More than twenty years later, however,
the California Supreme Court recognized that the "expectation of the
Dillon majority that the parameters of the tort would be further
defined in future cases has not been fulfilled.' ' 122 To the contrary, the
court observed, "subsequent decisions of the Courts of Appeal and
this court have created more uncertainty.,
12
In the years following the supreme court's decision in Dillon, the
"closely related" element of the Dillon guidelines was the subject of
several conflicting opinions, with no definitive ruling from the
supreme court to clarify the matter. 24 Ironically, however, the
California courts did not have the first opportunity to interpret the
meaning of the third Dillon guideline. In Leong v. Takasaki, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, which had already adopted the Dillon
guidelines for determining liability in negligent infliction of emotional
distress actions, allowed a child to state a cause of action for
emotional distress where the child had seen a negligently driven
automobile strike his stepfather's mother, with whom the child had
pled a very close relationship akin to that between a child and natural
grandmother.' 25 Although the court recognized that the victim could
not be fairly categorized as a true member of the plaintiff's nuclear
family, because there was no blood relation, the court nevertheless
held that the plaintiff could maintain his action because he allegedly
shared a relationship that was the functional and emotional
equivalent of a nuclear family relationship.
126
Only two years after the Hawaii Supreme Court decided Leong,
a California court of appeal had the opportunity to interpret the third
prong of the Dillon guidelines. In Mobaldi v. Regents of the
University of California, the appellate court permitted a woman to
recover for emotional distress suffered as a result of watching hospital
employees negligently administer a fatal dose of glucose solution to
her foster son. 12' After the child received the solution, the plaintifffoster mother held him in her arms as he experienced convulsions and
121. Id.
122. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 821 (Cal. 1989).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. See 6 WITKIN SUMM. CAL. LAW, TORTS § 850 (2001).
125. 520 P.2d 758, 766 (Haw. 1974).
126. Id. For other cases adopting a similarly liberal application of the third Dillon
guideline, see Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982); Beanland v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 480 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1973); Norwest v. Presbyterian
Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318 (Or. 1982);.
127. 172 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), disapproved on other grounds, Baxter v.
Super. Ct., 563 P.2d 871, 874 n.4 (Cal. 1977).
ultimately drifted into a life-threatening coma.28 In response to the
defendants' contentions that the plaintiff could not recover because
she lacked a blood-relationship with the victim, the Mobaldi court
held "[t]he emotional attachments of the family relationship and not
legal status are... relevant to foreseeability" for purposes of a Dillon
analysis. 2 9 The court went on to summarize the individual features of
the relationship between the victim and plaintiff, noting that the child
had lived with the plaintiff since he was only five months old, that the
plaintiff had unsuccessfully attempted to formally adopt the child, and
that the child had been baptized and given the last name of plaintiff
and her husband. 3 The court concluded that the relationship
between the plaintiff and her foster child demonstrated all the
qualities of a true parent-child relationship, "except those flowing as a
matter of law," and allowed recovery.'
Four years later, in Drew v. Drake, another California appellate
court refused to extend the right to recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress to a plaintiff who claimed to have lived with the
decedent in a "de facto spouse" situation.'32 In Drew, the plaintiff had
lived with her companion for three years, and allegedly shared a
relationship that bore all the indications and attributes of a true
spousal relationship, except those flowing from the law itself.'33 The
court reasoned that while emotional distress suffered by spouses or
parents meets the Dillon "closely related" guideline, "[t]o allow
persons standing in a 'meaningful relationship' (to use a
contemporary colloquialism) to recover for emotional distress
resulting in physical injury would abandon the Dillon requirement
that the courts ... mark out the areas of liability ... ""' The court of
appeal distinguished Mobaldi by noting that the hospital staff in
Mobaldi "knew the nature of the relationship" between the plaintiff
128. Mobaldi, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
129. Id. at 726.
130. Id. at 723. This is, of course, quite possibly how the Dillon majority anticipated
that "bystander" claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress would be resolved by
applying its guidelines. Indeed, the court in Mobaldi attempted to do nothing more than,
"on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances .... decide what the ordinary man
under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen." Dillon, 441 P.2d at 921
(emphasis added).
131. Mobaldi, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
132. 168 Cal. Rptr. 65, 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
133. Id. at 66. (citing Mobaldi, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 726).
134. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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and her foster child, thus rendering the plaintiff's emotional distress
reasonably foreseeable.'35
In two 1983 cases, Trapp v. Schuyler Construction,'36 and Kately
v. Wilkinson, 3' the courts of appeal found the Drew court's reasoning
persuasive, and denied recovery for emotional distress. In Kately,
two plaintiffs sought damages for the severe emotional distress they
suffered after observing a motorboat negligently manufactured by the
defendant, curve back towards a fallen skier and fatally injure her.'38
The court first recognized that the relationship between one of the
plaintiffs, Rebecca, and the victim, Rhonda, was quite close:
Rhonda and Rebecca were both 14 years old at the time of the
accident. They were best friends and were frequently in each
other's company, in each other's homes, and together on social and
recreational outings. Rhonda was treated as a "filial member" of
the Kately family, and Rebecca loved Rhonda, cared for her, and
held her life as dear as she would have a natural sister."'
The court similarly observed that the relationship between the
other plaintiff, Rebecca's mother, and Rhonda, "was very much akin
to that of mother and daughter."'' 0 The court explained, "Kately
loved Rhonda and cared for her and held her life as dear as she did
that of her natural daughter.''. Nonetheless, the court held that
135. Id. Certainly, this reasoning is highly questionable in light of the reality that
negligent actors will rarely be aware of the status of the various familial relationships of
their victims. Indeed, if a defendant has knowledge beforehand of persons to whom he
will owe a duty to avoid inflicting emotional distress, then it is likely that the plaintiffs'
claims in such cases would be properly analyzed under the "direct victim" theory of
liability established by the California Supreme Court in a line of cases beginning with
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). For a discussion of how the
supreme court generally muddied the waters of negligent infliction of emotional distress
recovery by adhering to its direct victim/ bystander dichotomy, see Heidenreich, supra
note 34.
136. 197 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
137. 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
138. Id. at 903-04. Apparently, the steering column on the boat had locked, thereby
preventing plaintiffs from steering the boat. When the column locked, the boat circled
back and struck the decedent's body, partially dismembering the skier's leg, and tearing
deep lacerations into her breast area, her groin, and her thigh. Id. at 904. Additionally,
the impact ripped a gash in the decedent's abdomen area, which resulted in partial
evisceration. Id. Aggravating matters further, when the two operators of the boat finally
managed to grab hold of their companion, one of the plaintiffs inadvertently "thrust her
hand into Rhonda's body through one of her wounds." Id. Finally, although the skier was
still alive when pulled from the water, the malfunctioning steering mechanism prevented
the party from returning to land; as a result, both plaintiffs were compelled to sit in the
boat with their mutilated companion until a rescue could be mounted. Id.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id.
"where, as here, the relationship is not a family relationship but one
[merely] akin to a family relationship because of friendship and past
associations, the relationship guideline [of Dillon] is not satisfied."'4 2
Similarly, in Trapp, a brother and sister brought an action for the
severe emotional distress that resulted from witnessing their first
cousin drown in a swimming pool negligently maintained by the
defendant.'43 Although there existed only a first cousin relationship
between the plaintiffs and the victim, each plaintiff had alleged that
they "played together often and had a relationship analogous to a
relationship between siblings."'44 The complaint further alleged that
the plaintiffs "loved [the decedent] as they would their own
brother.' 15  In sustaining the trial court's grant of defendant's
demurrer without leave to amend, the court of appeal plainly stated
that it perceived "no reason to extend reasonable foreseeability under
these facts to include first cousins, family members well beyond the
'immediate' family unit of parents and children.' 416 The Trapp court
concluded that even though it accepted as true the plaintiffs'
allegation that their relationship with the victim was akin to that of
siblings, the defendant could not have foreseen the quality of the
relationship, or that the plaintiffs "would witness the death of their
first cousin. '"14
In Ledger v. Tippitt, however, the court of appeal again reversed
its position on the application of the third Dillon guideline, and
permitted a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress suffered as a
result of witnessing the stabbing of her fianc6. 148 In Ledger, the
plaintiff observed the defendant stab her fianc6 after the two men had
engaged in a verbal altercation by the side of the road.' 49 Extending
142. Id. at 903 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the court appeared to challenge the
supreme court to take a firmer stance on the issue than it previously had in Dillon: "If we
err in construing the 'close relationship' guideline of Dillon v. Legg as requiring a
relationship at least legally cognizable, even if not one of blood or marriage (citing
Mobaldi), then it is for the Supreme Court to expand the rationale of Dillon." Id. at 907.
143. 197 Cal. Rptr. at 411. The emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs had
allegedly resulted in "disturbance [sic] and shock and injury to their nervous system, [sic]
resulting in gastrointestinal disorders, headaches, shock, anxiety, and loss of sleep." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 412.
147. Id. This rationale, however, much like that given by the Drake court, appears to
confuse the duties owed to bystander plaintiffs and those owed to direct victims of
negligent conduct.
148. 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
149. Id. at 816. Given the arguably intentional and outrageous nature of the act of
stabbing someone, it is curious that plaintiff did not plead intentional infliction of
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the reasoning of Mobaldi, the Ledger court observed: (1) the plaintiff
and victim had begun living together more than two years before the
accident, when the plaintiff was only fifteen years old and the victim
was nineteen; (2) the couple had a son that lived with them; (3) the
couple had tried to get married twice, but had been frustrated both
times by a car accident and the birth of their son; and (4) the
decedent had consistently provided the sole source of income for the
family and the plaintiff had been economically dependent on him.'
The court concluded that "it is foreseeable, as a matter of law, that
when defendant drew his knife, and stabbed [the decedent] ... the
woman a few feet distant seated in the vehicle was likely a loved one
who would suffer extreme emotional distress when [the decedent]
died in her arms."''
Finally, in Coon v. Joseph, the court of appeal refused to extend
the right to recover for emotional distress to a plaintiff who alleged an
''emotionally significant," "stable," and "exclusive" relationship with
his life partner.'52 There, plaintiff and his "intimate male friend" were
boarding a bus operated by the City and County of San Francisco
when the driver of the bus "verbally abused [plaintiff's partner] and
struck his face."'53  In his complaint for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiff alleged that he had been "living with
his friend for a year," and that the two men shared an "intimate,
stable and 'emotionally significant' relationship as 'exclusive life
partners.", 54 In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the court recognized
that a sufficiently close relationship to warrant recovery exists
between a parent and child,'55 a husband and wife,'56 and between a
man and woman who could establish a valid common law marriage in
a state that recognizes such arrangements.'57 The court nevertheless
concluded that the extension of the right to recover for emotional
distress to a plaintiff in an "intimate homosexual relationship...
emotional distress in addition to her claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress
and loss of consortium. See discussion of State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, supra
note 88.
150. Ledger, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
151. Id. at 826 (citations ommitted).
152. 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
153. Id. at 874.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 876 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Ochoa v. Super. Ct., 703
P.2d 1, 5-6 (Cal. 1985).
156. Id. (citing Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1977).
157. Id. (citing Etienne v. DKM Enters., Inc., 186 Cal. Rptr. 321, 322-23 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982).
would render ambivalent and weaken the necessary limits on a
tortfeasor's liability mandated by Dillon."5'
B. The Supreme Court Speaks: Elden and Thing
In 1988, the California Supreme Court, undoubtedly frustrated
by the inability of the courts of appeal to reach a consensus on the
proper scope of the third Dillon guideline, "broke new ground in the
area of negligent infliction of emotional distress"15 9 when it decided
Elden v. Sheldon.6° Only one year later, in Thing v. La Chusa, the
court set out to "resolve some of the uncertainty over the parameters
of the NIED action.
161
(1) Elden
The facts of Elden were simple. Plaintiff and his cohabitating
girlfriend were involved in a car accident caused by the defendant's
negligence, and the plaintiff's girlfriend, Linda Ebeling, was killed.162
Plaintiff Elden brought an action against the defendant, in which the
complaint stated three causes of action. 163  The first of plaintiff's
claims was for the physical injuries he sustained as a result of the
collision.16 The second and third claims were for negligent infliction
of emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing the fatal injury
to Ebeling, and loss of consortium, respectively.' After the trial
court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the latter two causes of
action, plaintiff Elden appealed to the California Supreme Court.
One commentator has suggested that had the supreme court in
Elden subjected the facts of that case to a traditional Dillon analysis,
plaintiff Elden "clearly would have recovered for his emotional
158. Id. at 877. The court attempted to distinguish Ledger: "The complaint here does
not allege facts establishing a 'de facto' marital relationship ... [n]or could such allegation
be made because appellant and [victim] are both males and the Legislature has made a
determination that a legal marriage is between a man and a woman." Id. at 877-78. Of
course, this aspect of the court's decision has been completely superceded by the
Legislature's recent enactment of section 1714.01 of the Civil Code.
159. Cavanaugh, supra note 8, at 462.
160. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
161. 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
162. 758 P.2d at 582. Although plaintiff sustained serious personal injuries from the
accident, Ebeling was actually thrown from the car, and died a few hours later as a result
of her injuries. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 582-83.
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distress." ' 66  The court, however, for a variety of policy reasons,
disposed of the Dillon analysis and concluded that unmarried
cohabitant plaintiffs could not recover damages for negligently
inflicted emotional distress under a bystander theory of recovery.161
Citing Ledger and Mobaldi, the plaintiff in Elden contended before
the supreme court that he should have been allowed to demonstrate
that his relationship with the decedent had been a "de facto"
marriage, and therefore satisfied the "closely related" guideline set
forth in Dillon.168 Plaintiff further relied on statistics showing that in
the years preceding the car crash, the number of unmarried
cohabitating couples had sharply increased, thereby rendering the
possibility that two occupants of a car are a couple involved in a de
facto marriage situation more foreseeable than ever before. 9
The Elden court began its analysis by conceding that it did not
dispute the factual premise underlying the plaintiff's contention:
There can be no doubt that the last two decades have seen a
dramatic increase in the number of couples who live together
without formal marriage, that some of these couples are bound by
emotional ties as strong as those that bind formally married
partners, and that they may share financial resources and expenses
in the same manner as married couples.17°
Significantly, the court further conceded that the frequency of
cohabitating couples in de facto marriage situations had increased to
the point that "emotional trauma suffered by a partner in such an
166. Cavanaugh, supra note 8, at 463. Cavanaugh suggests that the Elden majority
actually did find the relationship between Elden and Ebeling sufficiently close to warrant
protection under the third prong of the Dillon analysis, and further contends that "there is
little doubt that the facts of Elden would have fulfilled [the other two requirements] as
well: the plaintiff was 'located near the scene of the accident' since he was in the car with
the victim when the accident occurred, and his emotional injury apparently 'resulted from
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident."' Id.
167. Elden, 758 P.2d at 586. It might plausibly be argued that the court did not dispose
of the Dillon analysis at all, but merely decided one of the Dillon factors against the
plaintiff and concluded that because the analysis rests so heavily on the presence of each
of the three factors, that evaluating the applicability of the remaining two guidelines would
be pointless. For purposes of this discussion, however, the result is the same, and one
should not place extensive importance on the author's styling of the court's decision as
"disposing" of the Dillon analysis.
168. Id. at 585.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 585-86. (citing Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 109 n.1 (1976), in which the
court noted that the incidence of cohabitation without marriage increased 800 percent
between 1960 and 1970, and U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, No. 399 at 7 (Mar. 1984), in which the Department documented the number of
unmarried, cohabitating couples as having tripled between 1970 and 1984).
arrangement from injury to his companion cannot be characterized as
'unexpected or remote."""' However, the court relied upon the
Dillon majority's apparent acceptance of the proposition that "policy
considerations may dictate a cause of action should not be sanctioned
no matter how foreseeable the risk."'' The court concluded that this
proposition is self-evident, for the simple reason that the liability
assigned to a defendant whose conduct was merely negligent, must be
restricted "in order to avoid an intolerable burden on society."'73
Finally, the court delineated several policy reasons that, according to
the majority, justified rejecting plaintiff Elden's emotional distress
claim.
174
The first policy consideration cited by the Elden majority was the
state's interest in promoting the marital relationship.'75 The court
reasoned that if unmarried, cohabitating couples were freely granted
the same rights and privileges as afforded married couples, then the
state's interest in promoting marriage would be hindered. 6
Moreover, the court attempted to ward off criticism by explaining
that its emphasis on the state's interest in marriage was not related to
any "anachronistic notions of morality," but rather was based on the
"necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the
fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in
organized society.', 7  The court concluded that the plaintiff had not
provided a convincing reason why unmarried cohabitants, who do not
bear any of the legal responsibilities of marriage, should be permitted
to share in the privileges of marriage. 17
The second justification set forth by the Elden court for rejecting
the plaintiff's emotional distress claim was the burden that would be
placed on the courts if they were required to determine, on a case-by-
case basis, whether the emotional bonds between plaintiffs and
171. Id. at 586.
172. Id. The specific language relied upon by the majority was the Dillon court's
admonition, in its preface of its discussion of foreseeability, that foreseeability will only be
of primary importance in determining a negligent defendant's duty, and thus the extent of
his liability, "[f]n the absence of overriding policy considerations." 441 P.2d at 919
(emphasis added).
173. Elden, 758 P.2d at 586 (citing Diamond, supra note 4, at 490-93).
174. Id. at 586-88.
175. Id.
176. Id. The court found support in favor of its restriction of the right to recover for
emotional distress to only legally married couples in the state's decision to abolish
common law marriage in 1895. Id. at 587 (citing Norman v. Thomson, 54 P. 143, 145-46
(Cal. 1898)).
177. Id. (citing Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983).
178. Id.
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negligence victims were functionally equivalent to those between
legally married couples.179 The court reasoned that a thorough
determination of whether an unmarried couple's relationship
sufficiently approximated a legally married couple's relationship to
support an award of damages for emotional distress, would require
courts to "undertake a massive intrusion into the private life of the
partners," considering matters such as the sexual fidelity of the
partners and the degree to which each partner emotionally and
financially relied on the other."s Finally, the court set forth a third
policy rationale for rejecting Elden's emotional distress claim: "the
need to limit the number of persons to whom a negligent defendant
owes a duty of care.. 8
Justice Broussard filed a well-reasoned dissent in Elden, in which
he disposed of each of the majority's policy justifications, asserting
that "[o]ne need barely scratch the surface of these purported policies
to discover their hollowness."'" With regard to the state's interest in
promoting marriage, Justice Broussard countered that granting relief
to one who is already injured would be unlikely to detract from the
state's policy in promoting marriage .1 3  He further reasoned that
cohabitating couples that had chosen not to marry, for whatever
reason, would probably not choose to do so merely to gain standing in
some future emotional distress action, and that married couples
would still have "preferential status" in tort law since they are
presumed to be "closely related" under the third prong of the Dillon
guidelines." Turning to the majority's second justification for
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 588. The court referred to an often-cited New York case, Tobin v.
Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969), in which the New York Court of Appeals
observed, "Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters,
without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree." Perhaps Dean Prosser explained this principle more succinctly: "[I]f
recovery [for mental distress] is to be permitted, there must be some limitation. It would
be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has
endangered one man were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other
person disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an accident, and
every distant relative of the person injured, as well as his friends." Elden, 758 P.2d at 588
(citing PROSSER, supra note 41, at § 54, 334).
182. 758 P.2d at 590 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 591.
184. Id. Of course, Justice Broussard's "preferential status" theory, if adopted by
California courts, would foreclose the possibility of a system in which a negligent
defendant could, "even in the case of a parent and child or husband and wife, .... test the
operative facts upon which the claim is based irrespective of the de jure relationship."
rejecting Elden's claim-that extending the right to recover would
unduly burden the courts-Justice Broussard observed that in the
past, the court had soundly rejected the proposition that all plaintiffs
should be denied recovery in a particular field of tort merely because
of the difficulty in determining which plaintiffs truly deserved to
recover. 85  Indeed, Broussard argued that courts regularly and
capably evaluated the sensitive issues to which the majority had
apparently taken offense, each time they tried cases in which loss of
consortium was alleged.186 There, of course, the trier of fact must
calculate damages based almost entirely on the "intangible loss of
relational interests that include love, companionship, emotional
support, society and sexual relations."'87  According to Broussard,
therefore, the "burden on the courts" rationale espoused by the
Elden majority had been discredited by years and years of decisions
recognizing the validity of damages awards in actions involving loss of
consortium claims.
Finally, Justice Broussard rejected the majority's contention that
summarily denying recovery for emotional distress to unmarried
cohabitating couples adequately adhered to the foreseeability
concerns of the Dillon court. Although Broussard conceded that a
line must be drawn at some point in order to limit a negligent
defendant's liability, he nevertheless argued, "I do not share in the
majority's enthusiasm for crude, bright lines." '188 Instead, Broussard
stated that the extent of a defendant's duty, and thus his liability,
should "not be cut off on arbitrary, definitional grounds but on
functional grounds that correspond with real loss."''  Broussard
further recognized that under the hard-line stance of the Elden
majority, "[o]nly tortfeasors lucky enough to have injured a de facto
rather than a de jure spouse benefit from a bright line based on
marriage. 1.1  In conclusion, Justice Broussard quipped that the
Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 378 (N.J. 1993) (citing Dunphy v. Gregor, 617 A.2d 1248,
1254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)).
185. Elden, 758 P.2d at 592 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Broussard noted that Justice
Mosk, who authored the majority opinion in Elden, had rejected the "burden on the
courts" rationale in his dissenting opinion in Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858
(Cal. 1977). Id. at 592 n.4 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 592.
187. Id. Broussard continued, "[t]his assessment often requires consideration of
evidence concerning the quality and nature of the plaintiff's relationship with his or her
partner before and after the partner's injury." Id.
188. Id. at 593.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
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majority's apprehension regarding the possibility of an ever-
expanding class of tort plaintiffs "is just as empty now as it was in
Dillon."''
(2) Thing
In Thing v. La Chusa, the legal question before the California
Supreme Court was "whether the court of appeal correctly held that a
mother who did not witness an accident in which an automobile
struck and injured her child may recover damages from the negligent
driver for the emotional distress she suffered when she arrived at the
accident scene."'92 Upon first glance, it would seem that the high
court had no occasion to visit the third Dillon guideline; neither the
defendant nor any reported decision contended that a mother is not
"closely related" to her child for purposes of recovery under Dillon.
The court, however, by broadly framing the legal issue as "whether
the 'guidelines' enunciated by this court in Dillon v. Legg are
adequate, or if they should be refined to create greater certainty in
this area of the law," found a way to inject itself into the debate
concerning the "closely related" prong of the Dillon guidelines.'93
The Thing court observed that reliance solely on the
foreseeability of injury to a particular plaintiff had proven an
inadequate limit on liability in cases involving negligently inflicted
emotional distress.'9 The court further proclaimed that if liability out
of all proportion to a negligent defendant's culpability were to be
avoided, then the right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional
distress must be limited via the adoption of a bright line rule.' 95
Finally, despite its recognition that a bright line rule could lead to
arbitrary results, the court nonetheless concluded that recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress should be limited to persons
"closely related by blood or marriage since, in common experience, it
is more likely that they will suffer a greater degree of emotional
distress than a disinterested witness. ,,196 By the time the Thing
191. Id.
192. 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
193. Id. at 815 (citation omitted).
194. Id. at 826.
195. Id. at 827. The majority, therefore, flatly rejected the reasoning that Justice
Broussard had espoused in his Elden dissent, in which he specifically argued that a bright
line rule in this area of the law contravened the underlying emphasis on foreseeability that
had provided the momentum for the court's decision in Dillon.
196. Id. at 827-28. The court explained: "Such limitations are indisputably arbitrary
since it is foreseeable that in some cases unrelated persons have a relationship to the
victim or are so affected by the traumatic event that they suffer equivalent emotional
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court finished rearranging the Dillon guidelines, a plaintiff could
recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing another's
negligently caused injury,
if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury
victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury producing event at
the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the
victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress-a
reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested
witness and which is not an abnormal response to the
circumstances. 1
97
Il. The Validity of Elden and Thing
After the Enactment of Civil Code Section 1714.01:
A Proposed Standard
The California Supreme Court's hard-line approach to the
question of who qualifies to recover for negligently inflicted
emotional distress, as represented by its decisions in Elden and Thing,
distress. As we have observed, however, drawing arbitrary lines is unavoidable if we are
to limit liability and establish meaningful rules for application by litigants and lower
courts." Id.
197. Id. at 829-30. Interestingly, the court qualified the first prong of its analysis with a
footnote that stated, "In most cases no justification exists for permitting recovery for
NIED by persons who are only distantly related to the injury victim. Absent exceptional
circumstances, recovery should be limited to relatives residing in the same household, or
parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of the victim." Id. at 829 n.10.
Although some commentators have suggested that this "exceptional circumstances"
footnote adequately responded to critics who maintained that a strict, bright-line rule
would unduly deny recovery for unmarried couples in de facto marriage situations, or for
first cousins in relationships identical to sibling relationships, see generally Hallahan, supra
note 118, at 444-45, one court of appeal decision has questioned whether that footnote is
properly regarded as creating an exception at all: "Even if we were to presume that the
footnote created an exception to the 'closely related' requirement .. " Moon v. Guardian
Postacute Servs., Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 223 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Additionally, even if it were presumed that footnote 10 actually does create an
"exceptional circumstances" exception to the rule requiring a blood or marriage
relationship, it is not clear that any decision has relied solely on this exception in granting
recovery to a plaintiff unrelated by blood or marriage to a negligence victim. One recent
federal opinion applying California law did find that the plaintiff had alleged facts
sufficient to fall with the "exceptional circumstances" exception of Thing. See Estate of
Figueroa v. City of Santa Maria, No. CV 01-03319 FMC (Rex) (C.D. Ca. Aug. 6, 2001)
(order denying motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim). In Figueroa, however, the
court's reliance on footnote 10 of the Thing decision might be fairly viewed as dicta; the
court first concluded that the plaintiff's emotional distress claim was properly before the
court on a "direct" victim theory, thus rendering the Thing factors inapplicable: "In sum,
the court finds that the Thing limitations to NIED liability do not apply to the present case
because Plaintiff Thornhill is a 'direct victim,' as opposed to a mere 'bystander' witness, of
Defendants' alleged negligent conduct." Id. at 12.
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Reflect[s] a public policy exception which limits the right of a
bystander who did not suffer physical injury and was not threatened
with such injury to recover damages for the emotional distress [the
bystander] suffered as a result of witnessing negligent conduct
which caused physical injury to a third person.198
Indeed, if any and all bystanders who observe a negligently
caused physical injury to another were permitted to recover for any
resulting emotional distress, the defendant's liability "could be out of
all proportion to the degree of fault."199 However, the specific policy
justifications espoused by the supreme court, first in Elden, and then
in Thing, appear to have been seriously undermined by the
Legislature's willingness to extend the right to recover for emotional
distress to persons other than those related by blood or marriage."0
A. Policy Justifications Questioned
In Elden, the California Supreme Court premised its refusal to
extend recovery rights to an unmarried plaintiff that had cohabitated
with the decedent in a de facto spousal situation on three primary
policy considerations. The first of these policy justifications has been
the one perhaps most critically impacted by the Legislature's
enactment of Civil Code section 1714.01. The essence of the court's
first policy justification was that "to the extent unmarried cohabitants
are granted the same rights as married persons, the state's interest in
promoting marriage is inhibited."2 'l Certainly, the Legislature's grant
of the right to recover for emotional distress to domestic partners,
however, has at least partially, if not entirely, eroded the court's
doctrinal philosophy that the state's interest in marriage would be
harmed by the extension of the right to recover to persons other than
married couples and immediate family members.
The enactment of section 1714.01, however, should not be
interpreted so narrowly as to presume that the Legislature believed
that only domestic partners should be entitled to seek damages for
emotional distress, because only their relationships are sufficiently
foreseeable to justify extending a defendant's duty of care. To the
contrary, section 1714.01 plainly represents the Legislature's
willingness to discredit one of the fundamental underlying premises
198. Christensen v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 189 (Cal. 1991).
199. Id. (citing Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980); Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963)).
200. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (West 2002) (granting right to recover for
negligently inflicted emotional distress to domestic partners).
201. See Elden, 758 P.2d at 586.
of both Elden and Thing-that only the relationships between legal
spouses and blood relatives are sufficiently intimate to justify
extending a negligent defendant's duty of care to avoid inflicting
emotional distress.
Finally, once it is recognized that the state legislature has taken a
significant step towards completely undermining the first of the
supreme court's justifications for limiting the right to recover for
emotional distress to blood relatives and spouses, it is far from clear
that either of the remaining justifications, in and of themselves, justify
a continued adherence to the court's hard-line approach in contexts
other than the domestic partnership."2
B. Dunphy v. Gregor
The specific issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Dunphy v. Gregor was "whether bystander liability allows recovery
by a person who was not legally married to a deceased victim but who
cohabitated with and was engaged to marry the decedent.""2 3
Answering in the affirmative, the Dunphy court approvingly cited the
Appellate Division's conclusion that the law "should not ignore the
fact of a deep emotional attachment between... any two persons
who share an adequately earnest emotional commitment in a
relationship that is functionally equivalent to familial.'2"4
The court in Dunphy went on to specifically reject the reasoning
espoused by the California Supreme Court in Elden and Thing."'
202. If the courts, perhaps aided by the Legislature's enactment of section 1714.01,
begin to realize that familial bonds akin to those of blood or spousal relations may
promote society's interests to the extent that marriage and traditional family relationships
do, then Justice Broussard's comments on the remaining two policy justifications in Elden
would take on increasing significance. Again, Broussard discounted the Elden majority's
"burden on the courts" rationale as patently inconsistent with precedent, and rejected the
"limitation of liability" argument as permitting a negligent actor to "get lucky" by injuring
a de facto spouse, rather than a legal spouse. Elden, 758 P.2d at 592-93 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
203. 642 A.2d 372, 373 (N.J. 1994).
204. Id. at 374 (citing 617 A.2d at 1248) (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 375. On somewhat of a procedural note, the court first noted that the
California Supreme Court's clear frustration with what had proven to be an ambitious
expansion of bystander liability under the Dillon guidelines, had been a result of liberal
applications of the first two prongs of the Dillon analysis, rather than of the "closely
related" prong. Id. Despite the question as to whether the New Jersey court's
observation was accurate, in light of Mobaldi and Ledger, for example, the Dunphy court
concluded that New Jersey had not experienced any such liberal expansion of other
elements of the test under Dillon (Dillon had been expressly adopted as the law of New
Jersey in Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980)). The court therefore held that it had
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Positing that whether a duty exists in a particular case is ultimately a
"matter of fairness," the court concluded that requiring a bystander
plaintiff to plead and prove an "intimate familial relationship" is
hardly unfair.2" In a refreshingly simple return to the basic tort
principle of foreseeability, the court further explained that "[o]ne can
reasonably foresee that people who enjoy an intimate familial
relationship with one another will be especially vulnerable to
emotional injury resulting from a tragedy befalling one of them., 207
Adopting such a standard, according to the court, would allow lower
courts, on a case-by-case basis, to preserve the fundamental
distinction between the ordinary types of injuries that might be
expected among friends and distant relatives, and those 'indelibly
stunning' emotional injuries suffered by one whose relationship with
the victim 'at the time of the injury is deep, lasting, and genuinely
intimate.""'2  Stabbing at the majority decision in Elden, and
specifically adopting the reasoning of Justice Broussard's dissenting
opinion, the Dunphy court held that a standard based on the
significance and stability of the relationship between the plaintiff and
the negligence victim would adequately advance the primary goal of
tort law-to compensate innocent victims for their injuries-while
sufficiently limiting the liability of defendants whose conduct was
merely negligent.2"
In sum, the court in Dunphy observed, "[c]entral to a claim
under bystander liability is the existence of an intimate familial
relationship and the strength of the emotional bonds that surround
that relationship. '"21  After all, it is the quality of that familial
relationship that defines the severity of the emotional distress
suffered as a result of witnessing injury to another.2 1' The court then
proposed a multi-factored balancing test to aid courts in determining
whether the relationship between a plaintiff and a victim is
sufficiently intimate to support an award of damages for emotional
distress:
"[tihat standard must take into account the duration of the
relationship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of
no reason to follow the restrictive, hard-line approach adopted by the California court in
Elden, and reinforced in Thing.
206. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 376-377.
207. Id. at 377.
208. Id. (citing the opinion of the Appellate Division, 617 A.2d at 1254-55).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 377-78.
common contributions to a life together, the extent and quality of
shared experience, and.., whether the plaintiff and the injured
person were members of the same household, their emotional
reliance on each other .... and the manner in which they related to
each other in attending to life's mundane requirements.
212
C. Proposed Standard
An approach substantially similar to that taken by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Dunphy appears to be the approach most
compatible with the California Legislature's recent recognition that
persons other than spouses and blood relatives should be entitled to
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 3 Indeed, the
Legislature has effectively codified the primary principle recognized
by the Dunphy majority-that an intimate, stable, caring, supportive
familial relationship should give rise to a cognizable interest in the
emotional well-being derived from that relationship.2 4 That the
Legislature has only thus far extended the right to recover for
emotional distress to domestic partners should not prevent the
California Supreme Court from generally adopting the multi-factored
Dunphy analysis for use in all bystander negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases. Only in that way will the courts adequately
insure that recovery is permitted on the basis of an "intimate familial
relationship with the victim of the defendant's negligence."
Conclusion
In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes posited, "[t]he life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience., 21' For years, however, the
212. Id. at 378 (internal quotations omitted).
213. As noted above, supra note 184, the Dunphy majority held that the "intimate
familial relationship" requirement should be viewed as a two-way street; i.e., if an
unmarried cohabitating plaintiff is entitled to show that his relationship with the
negligence victim was "functionally equivalent" to a loving spousal relationship, then a
"defendant should always have the right, even in the case of a parent and child or a
husband and wife, to test the operative facts upon which the claim is based irrespective of
the de jure relationship." 642 A.2d at 378. However, adopting this portion of the Dunphy
court's analysis would undermine Justice Broussard's theory that actual de jure blood and
spousal relationships would always maintain their "preferred status" because courts will
assume that the emotional bonds in those relationships are sufficiently close and intimate
to support an inference of foreseeability and the extension of liability. That provision of
Dunphy should therefore be rejected in California as unnecessarily complicated and in
contravention of the state's established interest in preserving the importance of family
relationships.
214. See 642 A.2d at 380.
215. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co.) (1881).
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California Supreme Court, with its hard line approach to who may
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as represented
by its decisions in Elden and Thing, has turned a blind eye to our
common experience. That experience, as Justice Broussard
recognized in his Elden dissent, and as the New Jersey Supreme
Court recognized in its progressive holding in Dunphy, has been that
close familial relationships, "functionally equivalent" to relationships
based on blood or marriage, are far too prevalent in our society to
summarily shut them off from recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Perhaps now that the California Legislature, in
response to the tragic death of a woman whose partner could not
have recovered for negligent infliction of emotional distress even if
she had witnessed her fatal mauling, has taken the first step in
codifying that common experience, the California Supreme Court will
soften its hard line stance.

